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LINA KHATIB* 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The Arab Spring has brought about a fundamental change in 
the dynamics of political participation in the Arab world.  Under 
the authoritarian systems in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Syria, and other 
Arab countries, formal political participation was largely restricted 
to regime-affiliated party activity, co-opted civil society 
participation, or voting in nontransparent and often fraudulent 
elections.  Informal political participation, through social networks, 
underground political movements, and social movements, was 
often the only way for citizens to challenge their regimes.1  
Although the Arab Spring did not completely reverse this trend 
across Arab countries, it has brought, at an astonishing speed, a 
number of key improvements that facilitate formal political 
participation, particularly in Egypt and Tunisia.  But there are also 
a number of important challenges, old and new, facing formal 
political participation in the Arab world in this era of democratic 
transition.  The aim of this Article is to map out the key 
opportunities and challenges for political participation post-Arab 
Spring, and the way forward for formal political participation in 
the region as it negotiates democratic transition. 
2. POLITICAL PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION 
Political participation and democratic transition are tightly 
linked.  Not only is viable transition dependent on viable political 
participation, the way forward for political participation is also 
                                                     
* Lina Khatib heads the Program on Arab Reform and Democracy at Stanford 
University’s Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law.  The 
author thanks Ahmed Elsisi and Elizabeth Buckner for their assistance with 
researching this Article. 
1 See Amaney Jamal, Actors, Public Opinion, and Participation, in THE MIDDLE 
EAST 193, 231–37 (Ellen Lust ed., 12th ed. 2011) (describing how informal networks 
affect civil participation in the Middle East). 
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dependent to a great extent on the trajectory that democratic 
transition takes.  There are three key models through which 
processes of democratic transition have been understood by 
political scientists.  The simplest is Dankwart Rustow’s four-phase 
linear model of democratic transition, which states that countries 
go through the following phases in their journey towards 
democracy: 
1) National unity within a given territory 
2) Inconclusive political struggle, which often results in the 
emergence of one strong group, which hinders 
democracy 
3) Transition, which does not necessarily lead to democratic 
consolidation 
4) Habituation, which is the consolidation of liberal 
democracy.2 
Applying this model, one can argue that post-revolutionary 
Arab countries are currently in the third phase.  It is likely that this 
third phase will last for a significant period of time, and it may or 
may not lead to liberal democracy. 
The second model is the cyclical model, in which countries are 
seen to alternate between democratic and despotic phases.  Samuel 
Huntington argues that this model applies in cases such as where a 
strong military junta exists.3  According to Huntington, juntas may 
cede power to civilians to escape from their “own inability to 
govern effectively,” but this means that “neither authoritarian nor 
democratic institutions are effectively institutionalized.”4  In a 
country like Egypt, where the military has historically played a key 
political role (whether directly, as in the immediate post-Hosni 
Mubarak period, or indirectly, as in the period that followed), such 
an alteration is likely.   
                                                     
2 Dankwart A. Rustow, Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model, 2 
COMP. POL. 337, 351–61 (1970) (describing the conditions that make a democracy 
thrive). 
3 Samuel P. Huntington, Will More Countries Become Democratic?, 99 POL. SCI. 
Q. 193, 210 (1984) (“Once a military junta takes over, it will normally promise to 
return power to civilian rule.  In due course, it does so, if only to minimize the 
divide within the armed forces and to escape from its own inability to govern 
effectively.”).  
4 Id. 
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The third model, also presented by Huntington, is the 
dialectical model.5  In this model, countries go from despotism to 
democracy, and then back to authoritarianism, before finally 
progressing to longer-lasting democracy.  This model merges 
elements of the previous two, but is ultimately more optimistic 
about the prospects of liberal democracy.  The Arab world is likely 
to see examples of democratic regression as it negotiates the 
forthcoming period, where Huntington’s dialectic model may 
come into play. 
However, as Marc Plattner has argued, “the historical record 
shows that countries that have had an earlier experience with 
democracy that failed are more likely to succeed in a subsequent 
attempt than countries with no previous democratic experience.  
So even if democracy breaks down, it can leave a legacy of hope for 
the future.”6  What this means for the Arab world is that regardless 
of what transition model may apply, even if the coming period 
sees regression, what is more important is that the status quo has 
fundamentally changed, and the seeds for institutionalized 
political participation have been sown. 
3. FORMAL POLITICAL PARTICIPATION AND 
INSTITUTIONALIZATION 
There are two key ways in which the notion of “political 
participation” has been interpreted in political science discourse.  
The first, as presented by Holger Albrecht, defines political 
participation as deliberate activity in the formal political sphere 
that is aimed at changing policy.7  The second, as Laila Alhamad 
posits,8 takes a broader definition of participation that includes 
non-deliberate acts in the informal political realm.  The Arab 
Spring blurred the line between the formal and informal political 
                                                     
5 See SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, POLITICAL ORDER IN CHANGING SOCIETIES 132 
(1968) (“The relation between polity and society may well be dialectical rather 
than complementary.”). 
6 Marc F. Plattner, Liberalism and Democracy: Can’t Have One Without the Other, 
FOREIGN AFF., Mar./Apr. 1998, at 171, 180. 
7 Holger Albrecht, The Nature of Political Participation, in POLITICAL 
PARTICIPATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST 15 (Ellen Lust-Okar & Saloua Zerhouni eds., 
2008).  
8 Laila Alhamad, Formal and Informal Venues of Engagement, in POLITICAL 
PARTICIPATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST, supra note 7, at 33.  
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spheres.9  The Egyptian protests in Tahrir Square, for example, saw 
an almost seamless participation by established groups like 
political parties (such as al-Wafd), social movements (like the April 
6 movement), unofficial political groups (like the Muslim 
Brotherhood), civil society organizations, trade union members, 
and individuals not affiliated with any organized entity.10  The 
intersection between the two spheres was mostly manifested in 
how acts in the informal political realm, such as popular 
expressions of dissent, moved from being non-deliberate to 
deliberate vis-à-vis political change: people no longer expressed 
dissent in order to merely voice their dissatisfaction with the 
regime, but to deliberately effect political change, clearly 
demanding the fall of the regime.11  Therefore, in context of post-
Arab Spring democratic transition, it would be more instructive to 
conceptualize political participation in the broad sense as referring 
to the activities of political parties, civil society organizations, 
social movements, and citizens that are aimed at effecting policy 
change whether formally or informally. 
Yet despite this hybridity of actors and actions, democratic 
transition demands more from formal political participation 
because the foundations of democracy are ultimately built on the 
presence of democratic institutions.12  Democratic institutions are 
defined as “political institutions [that] . . . have a recognizable, 
direct relationship with . . . the making of decisions that are 
mandatory within a given territory, the channels of access to 
decision-making roles, and the shaping of the interests and 
identities that claim such access.”13  Such institutions include the 
                                                     
9 LINA KHATIB, IMAGE POLITICS IN THE MIDDLE EAST: THE ROLE OF THE VISUAL IN 
POLITICAL STRUGGLE 165 (2012) (arguing that informal protests “have real potential 
to translate into formal political change” and that politics has become an 
increasingly visual act in the Arab world). 
10 For a survey of who went to Tahrir Square, see generally Zeynep Tufekci & 
Christopher Wilson, Social Media and the Decision to Participate in Political Protest: 
Observations From Tahrir Square, 62 J. COMM., 363 (2012). 
11 See generally KHATIB, supra note 9 (discussing the role of protests in political 
participation and change). 
12 See Mark J. Gasiorowski & Timothy J. Power, The Structural Determinants of 
Democratic Consolidation: Evidence from the Third World, 31 COMP. POL. STUD. 740, 
741 (1998) (“[A]lthough political processes are obviously crucial in affecting the 
consolidation (or demise) of new democratic regimes, these processes, in turn, 
may be influenced in important ways by structural factors . . . .”). 
13 Guillermo A. O’Donell, Delegative Democracy, J. DEMOCRACY, January 1994, 
at 55, 57. 
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legislature, the judiciary, electoral institutions (including political 
parties), local government, the media, and civil society.14  For 
democracy to flourish, those institutions must exist and be viable; 
as Schedler argues, democracy faces an institutional challenge on 
two levels: first, on the level of establishing “representative 
institutions in form”, and second, on the level of rendering those 
institutions “effective in practice.”15 
An additional challenge for democracy is the timing of the 
development of those institutions.  Historically, three models have 
addressed this issue in relation to political participation.  The first 
model, presented by Nordlinger,16 argues that effective political 
institutions must be established before political participation is 
expanded.  The second model, by Dahl,17 similarly argues that 
successful expanded political participation is more likely to 
happen after expanded opportunities for political contestation.  
The third model, by Huntington, argues that it would be better for 
political “participation to expand early in the process of 
development, and before or concurrently with contestation.”18  
While the three models largely frame the notion of political 
participation around electoral processes, they remain useful in 
highlighting the importance of political institutions as a key factor 
for viable formal political participation more broadly, including 
participation in civil society.   
In the post-revolutionary Arab world, there are rising 
opportunities as well as challenges for political participation in 
relation to institutionalization, which are related to the above-
mentioned factors of building institutions, their effectiveness, and 
timing, but also go beyond them.  The focus of this Article is on 
formal political participation as it relates to political parties and 
civil society.  The next sections present the opportunities and 
challenges facing political participation in the Arab world in the 
                                                     
14 See Andreas Schedler, Authoritarianism’s Last Line of Defense, J. DEMOCRACY, 
January 2010, at 69, 71 (giving examples of institutions that authoritarian leaders 
often try to manipulate). 
15 Id. at 70. 
16 See generally Eric A. Nordlinger, Political Development: Time Sequences and 
Rates of Change, 20 WORLD POL. 494 (1968). 
17 See ROBERT A. DAHL, POLYARCHY: PARTICIPATION AND OPPOSITION 33–40 
(1971) (advocating the stability of a sequence where competitive politics precedes 
expansion in participation in comparison to other paths of transition to a 
polyarchy). 
18 Huntington, supra note 3, at 211. 
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context of democratic transition, first addressing the structure of 
political participation, and then its infrastructure. 
4. RISING OPPORTUNITIES FOR INSTITUTIONALIZED POLITICAL 
PARTICIPATION 
The Arab uprisings have created new structural opportunities 
for political participation stemming from the change in the political 
status quo.  This change has positively impacted the two pillars in 
the structure of political participation.  The first is the place of 
political participation.19  The period of democratic transition in the 
Arab world is seeing a move from the informal political sphere to 
the formal sphere, as well as a change in the formal political sphere 
itself.  Prior to the Arab uprisings, the formal political sphere in 
Tunisia, Egypt, Syria, and Libya was constricted by authoritarian 
governments.  Access to this space was open only to those within 
regime inner circles, be they ruling parties or ruling families; 
citizens’ engagement in politics was restricted to the informal 
political space.20   
Post-revolutionary Arab countries have seen the substantial 
creation of new political parties and non-governmental 
organizations, particularly in Egypt and Tunisia, which has 
signaled the opening up of the formal political sphere towards 
more inclusiveness.  In Tunisia, more than 110 political parties 
were registered after the fall of president Zine El Abidine Ben Ali,21 
while in Egypt, more than forty new political parties emerged after 
the fall of Mubarak.22  At the same time, established regime parties 
in those two countries have been dissolved and their remnants 
marginalized,23 no longer having a monopoly over the political 
                                                     
19 See generally Ellen Lust-Okar, Taking Political Participation Seriously, in 
POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST, supra note 7, at 1.  
20 See Jamal, supra note 1, at 198–237 (examining Arab citizens’ participation 
in various formal and informal venues). 
21 See Nizar Maqni, The Persistence of Ben Ali Party in Tunisia, ALAKHBAR (Jan. 
15, 2012), http://english.al-akhbar.com/content/persistence-ben-ali-party-tunisia 
(discussing the revolution in Tunisia that ousted the Constitutional Democratic 
Rally and spurred more than 110 parties to enter the political arena). 
22 See Big Turnout in Egypt Post-Mubarak Election, BBC (Nov. 29, 2011, 9:18 
PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-15932733 (noting that there are 
more than forty political parties competing in the election, altogether fielding 
more than ten thousand candidates). 
23 See, e.g., Amal A. Kandeel, Egypt at a Crossroads, 18 MIDDLE E. POL. 37 (2011) 
(chronicling political upheaval in Egypt). 
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process.  Citizens have also actively engaged in setting up new 
civil society organizations, with thousands of new non-
governmental organizations registered in the two countries after 
their respective revolutions.24  The formal political sphere, then, 
has become more open to citizens and is no longer restricted to 
regime-affiliated elites. 
The other face of this expansion is the change in the means of 
political participation, namely the institutions themselves.25  Before 
the revolutions, opposition efforts in the Arab world were largely 
not institutionalized, and mainly operated through informal social 
movements.26  In Syria, political activists operated through 
underground movements and through civil society activities often 
seen as apolitical,27 while Egypt saw the rise of oppositional social 
movements like Kefaya28 and the April 6 movement, as well as a 
number of grassroots citizen action groups like Shayfeen.com, an 
informal group dedicated to monitoring state fraud.  Governments 
either cracked down on groups aspiring to become political parties 
(as was the case with the Islamist group Ennahda in Tunisia), or 
created regulations that made it impossible for such opposition 
political parties to exist (like the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt).  In 
                                                     
24 See Laryssa Chomiak, Dir., Ctr. for Maghrib Studies in Tunis, Civic 
Resistance to Civil Society: Institutionalizing Dissent in Post-Revolutionary Tunisia, 
Remarks at the Program on Arab Reform and Democracy Third Annual 
Conference: Democratic Transition and Development in the Arab World (Apr. 27, 
2012).  Chomiak found that in Tunisia, 8,000 NGOs were registered under Ben Ali.  
After the Jasmine Revolution of 2011, this number rose to 10,000 according to 
official figures, and 20,000 according to unofficial estimates.  Id. 
25 See ALBRECHT, supra note 7, at 21–27 (examining the channels of political 
participation in the Middle East). 
26 See Marina Ottaway & Amr Hamzawy, Protest Movements and Political 
Change in the Arab World, 2011 CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT’L PEACE POL’Y 
OUTLOOK 1–13, available at http://carnegieendowment.org/files/ 
OttawayHamzawy_Outlook_Jan11_ProtestMovements.pdf (cataloguing pre-Arab 
Spring social movements throughout the Middle East and North Africa). 
27 See Wael Sawah, The Dialectic Relationship Between the Political and the Civil 
in the Syrian Civil Society Movement, 34 ARAB REFORM INITIATIVE ARAB REFORM BRIEF 
1, 3 (2009), available at http://www.arab-reform.net/sites/default/files/ 
ARB_34_Wael_Sawah_Syria_Eng.pdf (highlighting the tensions between Syrian 
civil society groups and political institutions). 
28 See generally NADIA OWEIDAT ET AL., RAND NAT’L DEF. RESEARCH INST., THE 
KEFAYA MOVEMENT: A CASE STUDY OF A GRASSROOTS REFORM INITIATIVE 1 (2008) 
available at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2008/ 
RAND_MG778.pdf (providing background and analysis of the Kefaya Movement 
in Egypt). 
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Tunisia, the leaders of Ennahda were persecuted by the 
government and forced into exile, effectively curtailing the group’s 
activity in the country.29  In Egypt, the government engaged in a 
series of coercive measures against the Muslim Brotherhood and 
other opposition groups.30 
One key forum for such measures was the law.  The Egyptian 
Law on Political Parties included a number of articles that limited 
the actions of political parties.31  New parties awaiting registration 
approval could not conduct any activities until this approval was 
granted.  The approval itself was a lengthy process and often 
resulted in the rejection of applications.32  Parties could not have a 
religious basis or oppose “the principles of the so-called Corrective 
Revolution” of Egypt’s first president Gamal Abdel Nasser, a 
method of denying legality to parties opposed to the regime.33  In 
addition, parties had to declare their contacts with foreign political 
parties.34  The December 1992 amendment to the law prevented 
“political activity by groups that lacked legal status and prohibited 
political alliances between such groups and legalized political 
parties” and thus particularly targeted the Muslim Brotherhood.35  
As a 1994 Human Rights Watch Report elaborates, this amendment 
meant that “[a]lthough the government had previously tolerated 
                                                     
29 See Aidan Lewis, Profile: Tunisia’s Ennahda Party, BBC NEWS AFR. (Oct. 25, 
2011, 9:57 AM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-15442859 (identifying 
Ennahda’s renewed political success in Tunisia following years of repression). 
30 See Samer Shehata & Joshua Stacher, The Brotherhood Goes to Parliament, 36 
MIDDLE E. REP. 32 (2006) (highlighting the success of the Muslim Brotherhood in 
Egyptian elections despite legislation put in place to hinder their participation); 
Dan Murphy, Egypt Cracks Down on Muslim Brotherhood Ahead of Elections, 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Nov. 24, 2010), http://www.csmonitor.com/World/ 
Middle-East/2010/1124/Egypt-cracks-down-on-Muslim-Brotherhood-ahead-of-
elections (identifying the various police tactics taken to prevent supporters of the 
Muslim Brotherhood from participating in Egyptian politics). 
31 See Law No. 40 of 1977 (Law on Political Parties), Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiyya, 2 
July 1977 (Egypt) (including sections detailing minimum membership, approval 
requirements, and punishments for those in violation of the law). 
32 See Eberhard Kienle, More than a Response to Islamism: The Political 
Deliberalization of Egypt in the 1990s, 52 MIDDLE E. J. 219, 222–23 (1998) (discussing 
the arduous application process for new political parties). 
33 Mustapha K. Al-Sayyid, A Civil Society in Egypt?, 47 MIDDLE E. J. 228, 237 
(1993) (noting legal limitations on party formation). 
34 Id. 
35 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH WORLD REPORT 1994—
EGYPT, (Jan. 1, 1994), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/1994/WR94/ 
Middle-02.htm#P137_70431 (last visited Jan. 10, 2012). 
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03_KHATIB (DO NOT DELETE) 4/9/2013  3:46 PM 
2013] TRANSITION IN THE ARAB WORLD 323 
its electoral alliance with legalized opposition political parties, the 
Muslim Brotherhood—by most accounts the largest and most 
vigorous opposition group in Egypt—was thus further excluded 
from formal participation in the political process.”36 
Two important sites of significant political activity in Egypt, by 
the Muslim Brotherhood and others, are trade unions and civil 
society.37  Thus, the trade union law was amended in ways that 
negatively impacted the inclusiveness of trade unions and blocked 
union participation of potential members likely to express dissent.  
For example, the 1995 amendment to the law restricted member 
voting eligibility to workers on permanent contracts, thereby 
excluding the growing number of workers employed on a fixed-
contract basis, and in turn, curbing the reach of the unions as well 
as their potential to harbor dissidents.38   
As people often channeled their political activities through civil 
society, the Mubarak government made sure that the law 
governing civil society organizations was also restrictive.39  Any 
new organization had to register with the Ministry of Social Affairs 
and commit to not engaging in “political activity”40—a phrase 
which was not defined, and thus allowed the Ministry to deny 
“registration to certain associations, the most famous being the 
Arab Organization for Human Rights and its Egyptian chapter, 
even though the first was given observer status in the U.N. 
Economic and Social Council.”41   
Similarly, in Tunisia, the Law on Associations governing civil 
society organizations limited such organizations to “women’s 
groups; sports groups; scientific groups; cultural and arts groups; 
charity, emergency, and social groups; development groups; 
                                                     
36 Id. 
37 See Jamal, supra note 1 (arguing that political participation and activity 
varies in political groups and by each citizen). 
38 See Kienle, supra note 32, at 227 (“[O]nly workers and employees on 
permanent or open contracts were eligible to run in union elections.  At the same 
time, the new rules allowed outgoing union leaders to stand for reelection on the 
sole basis of having been elected to their positions previously.  They no longer 
needed to be reelected at their own firm before being reelected to the board of the 
Federation or to one of its 23 branches.”). 
39 See Law No. 84 of 2002 (Law on Associations and Foundations), Al-Jarida 
Al-Rasmiyya, 5 Jun. 2002 (Egypt) (prohibiting unregistered organizations, 
providing discretionary and vague grounds for denials of applications, and 
restricting organizations from political activity). 
40 Id. art. 11(3). 
41 Al-Sayyid, supra note 33, at 236. 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2013
03_KHATIB (DO NOT DELETE) 4/9/2013  3:46 PM 
324 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 34:2 
amicable groups; and associations of public interest groups” 
thereby excluding groups working on democracy or human rights 
issues.42  Moreover, the government also did not set a time limit for 
granting new organizations approval, which prevented many 
organizations from existing legally.43 
In both countries, the government also restricted 
institutionalized political participation through close monitoring of 
political parties, political groups, civil society, and trade unions, as 
well as through practices like the suspension and dissolution of 
those groups, imposing restrictions on funding for political and 
civil society groups, cooptation attempts, and the harassment and 
arrest of members.44  In Tunisia, the Law on Public Meetings, 
Processions, Marches, Demonstrations and Gatherings curtailed 
public association by making it illegal to have any form of public 
gathering without both prior government permission and the 
presence of a member of the security services at said gathering.45  
In Egypt, the Emergency Law, which was first invoked in 1967 and 
has remained almost continuously in effect for more than forty 
years before finally being lifted in 2012,46 gave the government 
                                                     
42 Law No. 59-154 of 1959 (Law on Associations, as amended), Journal Officiel 
de la République Tunisienne, 7 Nov. 1959, arts. 1, 2, and 23.  
43 See Arab Spring: An Opportunity for Greater Freedom of Association and 
Assembly in Tunisia and Egypt?, 3 GLOBAL TRENDS IN NGO L., no. 1 (Int’l Ctr. for 
Not-For-Profit Law, June 2011), at 1, 3–4, http://www.icnl.org/research/ 
trends/trends3-1.html (last visited Oct. 29, 2012) (“The law does not impose a 
time limit in which a receipt must be issued.  Tunisian NGOs have reported that 
in practice, the government routinely withheld the required receipts, in effect 
preventing the registration of many independent NGOs.  Without the required 
receipt, NGOs lack evidence that they submitted their required paperwork, and 
are unable to appeal the de facto denial of their application to register.”). 
44 Id. 
45 Law No. 69-4 of 1969 (Regulating Public Meetings, Processions, Marches, 
Demonstrations and Gatherings), Journal Officiel de la République Tunisienne, 24 Jan. 
1969, arts. 2, 6, 7.  See also Arab Spring, supra note 43, at 6 (discussing government 
imposition on freedom of assembly through the oversight mandated by Tunisia’s 
Law No. 69-4 of 1969, supra). 
46 Egypt’s Emergency Law is Law No. 162 of 1958 (Law Concerning the State 
of Emergency), Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiyya, 28 Sept. 1958 (Egypt).  It was invoked in 
1981 following Sadat’s assassination and consistently renewed until finally 
expiring without renewal in 2012.  See President of the Republic of Egypt Decision 
No. 560 of 1981, Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiyya, 6 Oct. 1981, No. 40bis, p. 5 (Egypt) 
(decreeing a state of emergency in Egypt).  See also Amnesty Int’l, Egypt: 
Continuing Arrests of Critics and Opponents “Chill” Prospects for Reform, AI Index 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol34/iss2/2
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wide-ranging powers over the media, citizens, organizations, and 
public spaces in cases of “threats to national security.”47  Under the 
Mubarak regime, Article 3 of the Emergency Law was regularly 
used to detain hundreds of members of the Muslim Brotherhood, 
as well as a variety of activists who criticized the government.48 
The period of democratic transition following the Arab Spring 
has started to move towards institutionalization of oppositions, 
mainly through the formation of new political parties.  This move 
is due in part to changes in the law.  In Egypt, the political party 
law has been amended to allow new parties to be formed.  Two 
articles in the law have been revised: Articles 8 and 18.49   
In Article 8 two issues changed, the first regarding the 
formation of the political parties committee that approves new 
political party applications.  Under the old law, the committee 
members included the head of the Shura Council and the Minister 
of Interior Affairs,50 which allowed direct control over committee 
decisions by the ruling regime.  Under the amended law, the 
committee is composed of independent judges from different 
judicial institutions.  The second issue regards the establishment of 
new political parties.  Under the old law, the committee had the 
jurisdiction to refuse the establishment of any party by a binding 
decision.  Under the amended law, the formation of a new party is 
based only on a notice given by the new party to the committee, 
and the latter can only object to the establishment of a party (if the 
party did not fulfill one of the legal requirements) by raising the 
matter with the Supreme Administrative Court.  Political parties 
can be established only thirty days after sending their notice to the 
committee without any other restrictions, if the committee did not 
object.   
                                                                                                                        
MDE 12/021/2005 (May 27, 2005), available at http://www.amnesty.org/ 
en/library/info/MDE12/021/2005 (last visited Jan. 8, 2013). 
47 Law No. 162 of 1958 (Law Concerning the State of Emergency), Al-Jarida 
Al-Rasmiyya, 28 Sept. 1958, art. 1. (Egypt)  
48 Id. art. 3; see also Amnesty Int’l, supra note 46 (naming those arrested and 
expressing concern over Mubarak’s actions). 
49 Law No. 40 of 1977 (Law on Political Parties, as amended 28 Mar. 2011), Al-
Jarida Al-Rasmiyya, art. 1 (Egypt). 
50 The Ministry of Interior Affairs controls the Police Authority.  See About 
MOI: Introduction, MINISTRY OF INTERIOR—EGYPT, http://www.moiegypt.gov.eg/ 
English/AboutMOI/Introduction/About%20the%20Ministry (last visited Jan. 8, 
2013).  
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The second changed article, Article 18, previously mandated 
political parties to accept government subsidies.  Those subsidies 
were often used to buy off weak parties.  In the amended law, 
Article 18 has been repealed.51  Election laws have also been 
revised (in countries like Egypt and Tunisia) or created (in the case 
of Libya) to widen the participation of political parties.52 
Civil society has also had a new lease on life, with space for 
new non-governmental organizations to be formed and to operate 
more freely.  In Egypt, the restrictive NGO law was still in place at 
the time of writing; however, there were lobbying efforts to amend 
it.53  In Tunisia, the interim government elected in October 2011 
spent 2012 preparing for the drafting of a new constitution after the 
suspension of the old constitution.54  This has given space for the 
                                                     
51 See Law No. 40 of 1977 (Law on Political Parties, as amended 28 Mar. 2011), 
Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiyya, art. 2 (Egypt). 
52 For a detailed discussion on this point, see generally Ellen Lust, Voting for 
Change: The Pitfalls and Possibilities of First Elections in Arab Transitions (Brookings 
Doha Ctr.—Stanford Univ. “Project on Arab Transitions” Paper Series, No. 2, 
2012), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/ 
papers/2012/5/09%20arab%20democracies%20lust/09%20arab%20democracies
%20lust%20english.pdf (assessing the opportunities and challenges in democratic 
elections following the fall of authoritarian Arab regimes). 
53 The Egyptian government announced the release of the latest draft of a 
new NGO law in October 2012.  See NGO Law Monitor: Egypt, INT’L CTR. FOR NOT-
FOR-PROFIT LAW (Oct. 19, 2012 update on file with author) (detailing that the latest 
draft would reduce some restrictions on local NGOs but require them to request 
special permits to receive foreign funding and require foreign NGOs to receive 
permits to operate).  Cf. Draft Law: Foreign NGOs and Funding Still Require Permit, 
AHRAMONLINE (Oct. 3, 2012), http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/ 
1/64/54687/Egypt/Politics-/Draft-law-Foreign-NGOs-and-funding-still-require-
p.aspx (same). 
54 At the time of writing, the final text of the Constitution had not yet been 
approved, but consultations on the Constitution led by NGOs were taking place 
regularly.  See Tunisia Holds National Consultation Ahead of Drafting of Constitution, 
UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS (Aug. 2, 2012), http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ 
NewsEvents/Pages/TunisiaNationalConsultation.aspx (reporting on consultation 
meetings regarding human rights and the Constitution initiated by Tunisian civil 
society members with the facilitation of the U.N. Deputy High Commissioner for 
Human Rights).  [Editor’s Note: Following release of the draft constitution on 
December 14 2012, Tunisia’s National Constituent Assembly continued to invite 
civil society participation.  See Amira Masrour, Tunisian Civil Society to Weigh in on 
Constitutional Draft, TUNISIALIVE, (Dec. 19, 2012), http://www.tunisia-
live.net/2012/12/19/tunisian-civil-society-to-weigh-in-on-constitutional-draft/.  
An English translation of the draft constitution is available at 
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thousands of new NGOs and more than 110 political parties, which 
have emerged after the Jasmine Revolution, to operate.55  A viable 
civil society is important for democracy, as it allows the creation of 
“channels other than political parties for the articulation, 
aggregation, and representation of interests,” particularly for those 
from marginalized groups.56  The rise in civil society activity after 
the Arab Spring is a positive sign for the potential to widen both 
formal and informal political participation in the region. 
This new role for civil society within a democracy is 
significantly different from its role under authoritarianism.  In 
describing the status quo of the authoritarian Arab world, Albrecht 
put forward a distinction between “political professionals,” whom 
he characterized as those who make politics, and “political 
participants,” whom he characterized as those who influence 
politics.57  Unlike in democratic systems, however, under 
authoritarianism this distinction was not benign: the main reason is 
that, where only the regime and its loyalists “made politics,” and 
where establishing oppositional political parties was not possible, 
civil society organizations (CSOs) sometimes viewed themselves as 
alternatives to political parties.58  While influencing politics is an 
important role, having CSOs act in lieu of political parties 
presented a serious challenge to the development of effective 
democratic governance in the Arab world, since democratic 
governance is dependent on the presence of institutionalized party 
                                                                                                                        
http://www.constitutionnet.org/files/tunistian_consititution14_dec_2012-
english-undp.pdf.]  
55 See Tunisia, NDI, http://www.ndi.org/tunisia (last visited Mar. 30, 
2013); SHELLEY DEANE, INT’L ALERT, TRANSFORMING TUNISIA: THE ROLE OF CIVIL 
SOCIETY IN TUNISIA’S TRANSITION 12–15, 23 (2013), available at 
http://www.international-alert.org/sites/default/files/publications/ 
Tunisia2013EN.pdf.  Cf. ZACK BRISSON & KATE KRONTIRIS, INFODEV, THE WORLD 
BANK GRP., TUNISIA: FROM REVOLUTIONS TO INSTITUTIONS 76–78 (2012), available at 
http://www.thereboot.org/tunisia/Reboot%20-%20Tunisia%20From% 
20Revolutions%20to%20Institutions.pdf. 
56 Larry Diamond, Toward Democratic Consolidation, J. DEMOCRACY, July 1994, 
at 4, 8. 
57 See Albrecht, supra note 7, at 18–19 (noting that an activity can be regarded 
as political when it is intended to influence governmental decision-making, and 
not only when it is accomplished by professional politicians). 
58 See Alhamad, supra note 8, at 38 (describing the role played by CSOs in 
authoritarian countries in the Middle East and North Africa as alternatives to 
political parties with poor credibility and performance records). 
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systems that can participate in making politics.59  The post-
revolutionary Arab world is seeing a new viability for the realm of 
civil society “influence” as complementary to the political party 
realm, instead of a replacement, as well as a transition of people 
from the “influence” realm to the “make politics” realm.  In post-
revolution Egypt, for example, one civil society organization, the 
Federation of Economic Development Associations, contemplated 
registering as a political party in 2011, though it eventually opted 
for nominating candidates from its members as independents in 
the parliamentary elections that year.60  It is likely that the region 
will see more overt assertions of political ambitions among 
organizations that had previously operated under an economic or 
social umbrella, for the lack of other alternatives, as well as a move 
from political activity in the informal realm into the formal realm.  
In addition, it should be noted that political participation in the 
informal sphere has continued, but—as in the case of political 
party and CSO activities—it is now done with a lesser fear of 
censorship and government crackdowns. 
5. CHALLENGES FACING POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 
Despite the opportunities for increased political participation 
presented above, there are four main challenges to formal political 
participation in the post-revolutionary Arab world, particularly 
faced by new political actors.  The first challenge is the endurance 
of formal political institutions that benefit from sustaining the old 
political status quo.  In Egypt, the Supreme Council of the Armed 
Forces (“SCAF”) that took over running the country after 
Mubarak’s resignation continued to exert political control, to 
encroach on civil society, and to harass activists.61 In February 
2012, for example, the SCAF put on trial a number of Egyptian and 
foreign NGO workers who were charged with “illegal receipt of 
                                                     
59 See Scott Mainwaring & Timothy R. Scully, Latin America: Eight Lessons for 
Governance, J. DEMOCRACY, July 2008, at 113, 119–20 (analyzing the characteristics 
of institutionalized party systems as well as the ways they facilitate effective 
democratic governance). 
60 See Interview with Fouad Thabet, Chairman of the Fed’n of Econ. Dev. 
Ass’ns (Oct. 19, 2011). 
61 See Jeff Martini & Julie Taylor, Commanding Democracy in Egypt: The 
Military’s Attempt to Manage the Future, FOREIGN AFF., Sept./Oct. 2011, at 127, 128 
(“The generals have tried 7,000 people, including bloggers, journalists, and 
protesters, in closed military trials since the revolution.”). 
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foreign funds and illicit political operations.”62  It did not help that 
the NGO law that was still in place gave the SCAF a legal umbrella 
for this action.  In June 2012, the SCAF dissolved the parliament 
that had been elected in the fall of 2011, once again using the law as 
a pretext, saying that the parliament was unconstitutional due to a 
third of its seats having been elected through a first-past-the-post 
system.63  In response to those measures, in August 2012, the new 
Egyptian president, Mohammed Morsi, ordered the resignation of 
key members of SCAF leadership in a measure aimed at curbing 
the Council’s political power, a welcome move since “a reduced 
political role for the armed forces”64 is important for establishing 
equitable government institutions governed by the rule of law.65  In 
Yemen, on the other hand, the elite Republican Guard at the time 
of writing is still under the control of the son of ousted president 
Ali Abdullah Saleh, who also continues to wield influence via old 
guard from the former ruling party, the General People’s Congress.  
Enduring institutions from old regimes make it difficult for new 
political entities to enter the formal political sphere. 
The second challenge, which is related to the above and 
witnessed in Egypt as well as other Arab countries, is that the 
political sphere often overlaps with the social and economic 
spheres, making it difficult for emerging political entities and 
newly formed government institutions to carve an independent 
path.66  On the economic level, the political elites in Arab countries 
                                                     
62 Brotherhood not ‘Intimidated’ by US Aid Threat over Orwellian NGO 
Crackdown, DEMOCRACY DIGEST (Feb. 27, 2012), http://www.demdigest.net/ 
blog/2012/02/brotherhood-not-intimidated-by-us-aid-threat-over-orwellian-ngo-
crackdown/. 
63 See Court Allows Shafiq to Stay in Egypt Race, Declares Invalidity of 1/3 
Parliament Seats, AL ARABIYA NEWS, (June 14, 2012, 8:23 PM), 
http://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/06/14/220537.html (“The 
constitutional court ruled unconstitutional some articles of the parliamentary 
election law related to the direct voter system . . . .”).   
64 See Baladas Ghoshal, Democratic Transition and Political Development in Post-
Soeharto Indonesia, 26 CONTEMP. SOUTHEAST ASIA 506, 507 (2004) (identifying a 
reduced role for the armed services as part of the democratic structure).  
65 See Yezid Sayigh, Above the State: The Officers’ Republic in Egypt, CARNEGIE 
PAPERS (CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT’L PEACE), Aug. 2012, at 25–26, available at 
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/officers_republic1.pdf (“No less 
crucial for Egypt’s emerging civilian authorities and new political class is to block 
SCAF claims to a guardianship role as ‘protector’ of the constitution or to an 
exceptional status placing it permanently above civilian authority and law.”). 
66 See generally Lust-Okar, supra note 19. 
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are often also the economic elites. The SCAF owns and controls a 
significant proportion of Egypt’s economic assets, such as the gas 
and oil sectors as well as commercial assets.67  It has put pressure 
on Egypt’s new president and government not to change the 
economic policies allowing it to maintain its power.68  The Muslim 
Brotherhood, which has ascended to power after the January 25 
Revolution, also boasts businessmen with significant economic—
and political—clout among its members.69  In such a case, even 
though the formal political sphere may become more open in 
principle, access to this space remains restricted by enduring social 
and economic monopolies.  On the social level, formal political 
institutions in the Arab world are infused with informal 
institutional ties.70  For example, parliaments are often infused with 
tribal or sectarian politics.  This serves to reduce their public 
service role, as parliamentarians end up acting as representatives 
of exclusive rather than inclusive social groups.71  In Yemen, the 
tribes have traditionally based their political engagement on 
negotiations with the state,72 which has meant placing themselves 
as distinct from it.  Democratic transition necessitates a change in 
this dynamic if inclusive governance and political participation are 
to be achieved. 
It would be misleading to assume that the transition to 
democracy would bring with it an automatic breakdown of this 
                                                     
67 See Sayigh, supra note 65 (describing how SCAF’s political elitism affects 
the economic sector).  See also Shana Marshall & Joshua Stacher, Egypt’s Generals 
and Transnational Capital, 42 MIDDLE E. REP. 262 (2011) (noting how the United 
States nudges SCAF onto a path similar to Gamal’s in order to make certain that 
Egypt’s economic policies remain intact). 
68 See Stephen Glain, Egypt at War with Itself, NATION (June 6, 2012), 
http://www.thenation.com/article/168263/egypt-war-itself# (describing the 
pressures placed on Egypt’s new government to continue its economic policies). 
69 See Suzy Hansen, The Economic Vision of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood 
Millionaires, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (April 19, 2012), 
http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-04-19/the-economic-vision-of-
egypts-muslim-brotherhood-millionaires (arguing that prominent businessmen 
from the Brotherhood are likely to form the Brotherhood’s leadership core). 
70 See Albrecht, supra note 7 (describing efforts to strengthen formal civil 
society groups in the Arab world).  
71 Id. at 22 (contending that formal institutions such as parliaments often 
exclude more than include many social strata).  
72 See Alhamad, supra note 8, at 44–45 (citing conflicts between the 
government and tribes in Yemen, in which the tribes organize to oppose the 
government, and tribal chiefs serve as intermediaries between the two).  
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dynamic.  Formal political institutions risk being undermined by 
sustained political participation through informal institutions,73 as 
informal institutions like kinship and clientelistic networks 
continue to take on the role of formal institutions, for example, 
through the provision of social services.  Already the Tunisian 
elections have illustrated this, with the surprise win of twenty-six 
parliamentary seats in the October 2011 election by a new party, 
the Popular Petition for Freedom, Justice, and Development, 
headed by a media figure considered close to the ousted President 
Zine El Abidine Ben Ali.74  The Party had been accused of engaging 
in financial irregularities during the election, leading to the 
revoking (and later reinstatement) of most seats it won in the 
election.75  The Party’s win has been attributed to its appeal to the 
poor with promises such as universal health care, increased social 
spending through cash handouts, and injecting cash into the state 
budget—populist appeals that capitalized on the reputation of the 
Party’s leader as a wealthy expatriate seen as able to deliver on 
such promises.76 
The third challenge for all transitioning countries in the region 
is that periods of democratic transition are unstable and can result 
in people yearning for calm and stability.  This yearning may 
attract citizens—particularly when voting—towards well-
established political entities over newly emerging ones.  In Tunisia 
and Egypt, this trend, to some degree, explains the wide victories 
of Ennahda and the Muslim Brotherhood in the 2011 parliamentary 
elections and Egypt’s 2012 presidential election, compared with 
how newer political entities have fared.  In Egypt, for example, the 
newly formed youth political party, the Egyptian Current, did not 
achieve a win in the parliamentary elections largely because of its 
                                                     
73 See Lust-Okar, supra note 19, at 2 (introducing one of the goals of the text to 
study the way in which informal and formal politics “interface”).  
74 See Surprise Tunisian Poll Success for London-Based Millionaire, AFP (Oct. 25, 
2011), http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ 
ALeqM5j4MIy4frRcXDwE8QzwuDR2rbbm2g?docId=CNG.d2bfb13e2013e477cebe
fe8ffd8277d7.7b1 (discussing the political activity of Hechmi Haamdi, potentially 
contravening election laws). 
75 See Sana Ajmi, Aridha Chaabia’s Seats Reinstated, TUNISIALIVE (Nov. 8, 2011), 
http://www.tunisia-live.net/2011/11/08/aridha-chaabia-gaining-its-seats-
back/. 
76 See Surprise Tunisian Poll Success for London-Based Millionaire, supra note 74 
(listing the services Haamdi pledged). 
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members’ lack of political experience.77  But this craving for 
stability may also give remnants of the old regime the opportunity 
to “make a bid for power in the name of stability and 
development” in subsequent elections (similar to what occurred in 
Indonesia while it was undergoing transition), particularly if the 
newly elected governments are not able to maintain stability 
because of their lack of experience in governance.78  This again 
limits opportunities for participation by new political entities. 
The fourth challenge is that formal political participation, 
whether through political parties or civil society, can only be 
inclusive when there is an “increased capacity of subordinate 
groups to have an effective role in shaping public policy.”79  
Minorities and women in the Arab world are largely not fairly 
represented in political institutions.80  Although those groups 
participated in the revolutions of the Arab Spring, their role in the 
post-revolutionary period remains marginalized, and in certain 
cases has worsened.  Electoral law reform in post-revolution Egypt 
eliminated the pre-revolution women’s quota system governing 
parliamentary representation, resulting in the election of just nine 
women in the parliamentary elections of 2011;81 Article 10 in 
Egypt’s 2012 Constitution opens the door for limiting women’s 
participation in public life through declaring that “[t]he State is 
keen to preserve the genuine character of the Egyptian family, its 
                                                     
77 See Eric Trager, The Unbreakable Muslim Brotherhood: Grim Prospects for a 
Liberal Egypt, FOREIGN AFF., Sept./Oct. 2011, at 114, 124 (arguing that the Egyptian 
Current Party’s long-term political impact “will depend on its members’ ability to 
draw from, or replicate, the Brotherhood’s nationwide networks”). 
78 Ghoshal, supra note 64, at 515. 
79 Patrick Heller, Democratic Deepening in India and South Africa, 44 J. ASIAN & 
AFR. STUD. 123, 124 (2009). 
80 See Nils-Christian Bormann et al., The Arab Spring and the Forgotten Demos 4 
(Nat’l Ctr. of Competence in Research, Working Paper No. 52, 2012), 
http://www.nccr-democracy.uzh.ch/publications/workingpaper/pdf/ 
WP_52.pdf (“[North African and Middle Eastern countries] do not only exhibit 
the highest levels of ethnic exclusion, they are also afflicted by the highest 
concentration of political discrimination along ethnic lines . . . .”).  
81 See Moushira Khattab, Egyptian Women After the Revolution: Lost in 
Translation?, MIDDLE E. PROGRAM OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES (Wilson Ctr.) Summer 
12, at 14, 15, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Arab% 
20Awakening%20Marginalizing%20Women_0.pdf (“[T]here are only 11 (out of 
508) female parliament members, two of whom were token appointments by the 
Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF).  Women make up 50 percent of 
Egypt’s population of 90 million, yet are represented by a 2 percent minority in 
parliament.”). 
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cohesion and stability, and to protect its moral values, all as 
regulated by law.”82  In Tunisia, a “zipper” list system alternating 
female and male candidates was applied to the 2011 parliamentary 
elections,83 but because 94% of the lists were headed by male 
candidates, fewer women won seats in 2011 than during the period 
of Ben Ali rule.84  Libya, on the other hand, implemented a zipper 
electoral system in 2012 that also required women to be included at 
the top of candidate lists, resulting in a 17% representation of 
women in Libya’s first General National Congress.85  However, 
women still face the challenge of equitable participation in other 
avenues of public life.86 
Minorities also face a number of enduring, and sometimes 
escalating, challenges brought about by sectarianism and ethnic 
tensions as well as by changes in state legislation.  In Egypt, the 
Coptic community has been alarmed by the overwhelming 
parliamentary and presidential victories of Islamists and the 
subsequent attempts at institutionalizing further oversight by 
                                                     
82 Nariman Yousef, Egypt’s Draft Constitution Translated, EGYPT INDEPENDENT 
(Dec. 2, 2012, 1:15 PM), http://www.egyptindependent.com/print/1278681 
(translating the November 30 draft constitution).  The language quoted is Article 
10.  [Editor’s Note: Egypt’s State Information Service has not yet published the 
Constitution on its website.  For alternative translations, see The New Constitution 
of the Arab Republic of Egypt, http://www.constitutionnet.org/files/ 
final_constitution_30_nov_2012_-english-_-idea.pdf; The 2012 Constitution of Egypt, 
Translated by Nivien Saleh, with Index, http://niviensaleh.info/constitution-egypt-
2012-translation/.   
83 Duncan Pickard, How Well Did Women Really Fare in Tunisia’s Elections?, 
POWER & POL’Y, Dec. 6, 2011, http://www.powerandpolicy.com/ 
2011/12/06/how-well-did-women-really-fare-in-tunisia%E2%80%99s-elections/ 
(last visited Nov. 1, 2012) (“[B]y law, half of the candidates [in Tunisia] were 
women.  Tunisia’s ‘innovative’ list system also required that names on ballots 
alternate by gender, known as a zipper rule.”). 
84 Lust, supra note 52, at 13 n.29. 
85 See Dominique Soguel, Libyan Elections Give Women a 17% Starting Point, 
FORBES (July 19, 2012, 4:07 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/womensenews/ 
2012/07/19/libyan-elections-give-women-a-17-starting-point/ (stating that the 33 
women had been elected to serve in Libya’s General National Congress, giving 
women a 16.5% representation in the 200-member transitional authority). 
86 See generally Kathryn Spellman-Poots, Women in the New Libya: Challenges 
Ahead, 50.50 INCLUSIVE DEMOCRACY, Dec. 23, 2011, 
http://www.opendemocracy.net/5050/kathryn-spellman-poots/women-in-new-
libya-challenges-ahead (noting the impact that factors such as conservative gender 
codes, increased religiosity in society, and Gaddafi’s “state feminism” have on the 
prospects for women’s right in post-revolution Libya).  
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Muslim clerics over legislation, such as within Egypt’s new 
Constitution, leading Coptic members of the Constituent Assembly 
to withdraw their membership in protest.87  In Libya, tensions 
between Eastern and Western parts of the country, as well as 
between different ethnic communities, continued even after the 
country’s first post-revolution elections on July 7, 2012.88  In Syria, 
sectarian tensions between the country’s Alawite, Christian, and 
Sunni communities resulting from Bashar al-Assad’s regime’s 
“divide, co-opt, and rule” strategy became more acute as the 
revolution against Assad transformed into an armed conflict.89  
Those countries are yet to engage in reforms that would ensure fair 
political participation for their minorities. 
To address those challenges, ruling parties and newly elected 
political leaders, whether presidents or parliamentarians, can 
engage in reform from above through working to reduce the 
influence of authoritarian old regime institutions—like the military 
in countries like Egypt and Yemen—to empower new political 
actors.  They must also ease the creation of formal entities through 
reforming the laws governing political participation—like those on 
the formation and behavior of political parties and CSOs—to allow 
new actors to exist and compete in a fair and transparent 
environment. 
                                                     
87 Yasmine Fathi, Egypt Copts React to Islamist Electoral Win, AHRAMONLINE 
(Dec. 4, 2011), http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/28346.aspx (surveying the 
negative reactions of members of Egypt’s Coptic Christian community to Islamic-
oriented political groups winning more than half of the parliamentary seats in 
Egypt’s 2011 elections); Christians, Liberals Left Out as Islamists Back Egypt’s Draft 
Constitution, WORLDNEWS ON NBCNEWS.COM (Nov. 30, 2012, 4:18 AM), 
http://worldnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/11/30/15561689-christians-
liberals-left-out-as-islamists-back-egypts-draft-constitution?lite. 
88 Emanuela Paoletti, Libya: Roots of a Civil Conflict, 16 MEDITERRANEAN POL. 
313, 313–17 (describing contemporary problems arising from Libya’s “long-
standing internal divisions” as well as Libyan society’s “tribal structure”); What 
Next? Impacts of the July, 2012 National Elections, CAERUS, 
http://caerusassociates.com/ideas/libyan-elections/ (last visited Aug. 23, 2012) 
(averring that difficulties forming a central, national government will arise due to 
the fact that the eastern region will seek “greater autonomy and power” because 
of its oil wealth and that “ethnic tensions” continue “to complicate the security 
situation”). 
89 See Raymond Hinnebusch, Syria: From ‘Authoritarian Upgrading’ to 
Revolution? 88 INT’L AFF. 95, 96–97 (2012) (detailing Syria’s religious fragmentation 
and conflict between the Sunni and Alawi sects). 
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6. AN INFRASTRUCTURE FOR FORMAL POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 
As presented above, the post-revolutionary Arab world is 
seeing a change in the structure of political participation, namely 
the structures governing the existence, composition, and actions of 
political parties and CSOs.  However, one of the biggest challenges 
for post-revolutionary Arab countries concerns another step—how 
to channel informal activism into sustainable political change 
through the formation of new political institutions.  Structural 
changes need to be combined with bottom-up infrastructural 
changes in order for formal political participation to become viable.  
This is particularly important in countries with little or no 
infrastructure to support the creation of viable political 
institutions—like in Syria or Libya—where it is possible that 
authoritarian political institutions could be replaced with weak 
ones.90 
At the bottom-up level, civil society organizations can 
themselves play a role in the process of legal reform, as witnessed 
in Tunisia and Egypt where such CSOs are active in lobbying and 
in working on draft laws.91  On the level of the citizen, citizen 
journalism, demonstrations, and participation in neighborhood 
committees have all been avenues through which citizens engaged 
in overt political participation during the Arab revolutions.92  This 
informal participation has fostered the idea of “popular 
sovereignty” where the citizen is no longer dependent on the state 
as the sole source of power.93  But during democratic transition, 
                                                     
90 Ghoshal, supra note 64, at 508 (stating that without the creation of viable 
political parties, democratic transitions could potentially “revers[e] and 
backslid[e] . . . toward stagnation and retrenchment”). 
91 NGO Law Monitor: Egypt, supra note 53 (“The vast majority of Egyptian 
NGOs, consciously apolitical and primarily concerned with issues such as the 
environment, education, and welfare, are generally left to operate without 
substantial government interference.”). 
92 See Sahar Khamis & Katherine Vaughn, Cyberactivism in the Egyptian 
Revolution: How Civic Engagement and Citizen Journalism Tilted the Balance, 14 ARAB 
MEDIA AND SOC’Y, (Summer 2011), http://www.arabmediasociety.com/ 
articles/downloads/20120313094800_Khamis_Cyberactivism_updated.pdf 
(discussing how social media operated as an effective tool for promoting civic 
engagement in the Egyptian revolution).  
93 See Nader Hashemi et al., Arab Spring—Chief Consequence?, GLOBAL BRIEF 
(Oct. 19, 2011), http://globalbrief.ca/blog/the-definition/what-is-the-principal-
near-term-consequence-of-the-arab-spring/4360 (“[P]opular sovereignty with a 
certain pan-Arab cultural dimension has become the regional ideal.”). 
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citizen sovereignty needs to be coupled with institutionalization so 
that citizens can engage in formal political activity, from voting to 
establishing and participating in the work of political institutions.  
Five factors are needed for citizens to achieve the latter: 
organization (by people into institutions); leadership (where those 
institutions have leadership structures); a coherent political 
program or agenda and long-term goals by those institutions; a 
long-term strategy to achieve those goals; and the ability to form 
coalitions with other groups.  A critique of these five factors 
follows. 
6.1. Organization 
The presence of organized political groups is a cornerstone of 
formal political participation.  In the post-revolutionary Arab 
world, there is a sharp division between those with no prior 
experience of political organization and those who had existing 
organizational structures prior to the Arab Spring.  The first group 
is composed of those Arab citizens, particularly the youth, whose 
will to organize into formal political groups is not strong enough 
yet, or who do not yet have the capacity for effective organized 
political participation, especially in places where the infrastructure 
for such activity is weak.  Although the Arab world is witnessing 
an unprecedented youth bulge,94 young people in the region 
remain largely suspicious of formal politics.  This is due not only to 
the structural factors discussed above, which make it difficult for 
new faces to break into the formal political realm, but also to the 
lack of necessary political skills95 coupled with the youth’s high 
expectations from any new political entities and figures,96 which 
                                                     
94 See ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUDIES, 
RETHINKING THE ARAB “SPRING”: STABILITY AND SECURITY IN EGYPT, LIBYA, TUNISIA, 
AND THE REST OF THE MENA REGION 10–11 (2011) (providing numerical data 
illustrating the growing percentage of youth in countries across region). 
95 Cf. Loubna Skalli Hanna, Assistant Professor, Sch. of Int’l Serv., American 
Univ, Youth, ICTs and Development Opportunities, Remarks at the Program on Arab 
Reform and Democracy Third Annual Conference: Democratic Transition and 
Development in the Arab World (Apr. 26, 2012).  Skalli Hanna’s presentation 
slides are available at http://iis-db.stanford.edu/evnts/7028/Skalli-
Hanna,_Loubna._Youth,_ICTs_and_Development_Opportunities.pdf.  
96 An example is the high expectations placed on Egypt’s first post-
revolutionary parliament, as well as President Mohammed Morsi.  The 
Morsimeter, a website set up by youth to monitor whether Morsi has delivered on 
his electoral platform promises, is a way in which such high expectations are 
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inevitably result in disappointment in the process of democratic 
transition.  The second group is composed of Islamists and older 
political parties, who have capitalized on their existing 
organizational infrastructures to quickly form or re-form political 
parties that have contested elections, as was the case in Tunisia, 
Egypt, Yemen, and Libya. 
6.2. Leadership 
Organized political groups necessitate the existence of 
leadership structures.  Youth suspicion of formal politics, as 
discussed above, is also driven by idealism and aversion to the 
idea of leadership due to the youth’s negative experience with 
authoritarianism.  In Morocco, the February 20 youth movement 
that started a limited protest campaign in 2011, inspired by the 
Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions, remained firmly “horizontal” 
in structure, with young activists firmly rejecting the installation of 
any kind of hierarchy among themselves, effectively stopping the 
movement from becoming a political party.  This lack of leadership 
structure rendered the movement unable to go further in its 
political demands, and led to its eventual demise vis-à-vis 
hierarchical groups like the Justice and Development Party, which 
not only contested the parliamentary elections in October 2011, but 
also won the majority of seats.97  A large section of Arab youth has 
yet to embrace the concept of leadership as not being necessarily 
equivalent to authoritarianism, but as fulfilling an indispensable 
role that enables goals to be achieved for the good of the group.  As 
Marc Plattner observes, “the often-noted fact that the Arab 
uprisings were ‘leaderless revolutions’ . . . may be fine at the 
popular-mobilization stage but is not a terribly helpful 
circumstance when it comes to navigating the potentially 
treacherous currents of democratic transition.”98  This serves to 
partly explain why the young people who started and sustained 
the revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt have been relatively absent in 
                                                                                                                        
channeled.  See MORSI METER!, http://www.morsimeter.com/en (last visited Jan. 
9, 2013). 
97 See, e.g., Ahmed Benchemsi, Feb20’s Rise and Fall: A Moroccan Story, LE BLOG 
DE AHMED BENCHEMSI (July 17, 2012), http://ahmedbenchemsi.com/feb20s-
rise-and-fall-a-moroccan-story (arguing that the February 20 youth movement 
needs organization “first and foremost”). 
98 Marc F. Plattner, Comparing the Arab Revolts: The Global Context, J. 
DEMOCRACY, October 2011, at 5, 11. 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2013
03_KHATIB (DO NOT DELETE) 4/9/2013  3:46 PM 
338 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 34:2 
the immediate post-revolutionary period; it also raises serious 
questions about the representativeness of the newly formed 
political parties in those countries and their responsiveness to 
expectations and needs, two crucial factors for inclusive political 
participation.  Islamist parties, on the other hand, have proven 
through their hierarchical structures that leadership is crucial for 
electoral victories and further political clout. 
6.3. Political programs and goals 
Political groups must have clear political programs and goals 
in order to be viable.  Many emerging political groups in the Arab 
world lack those requirements.  While other new political entities 
in the post-revolutionary Arab world may have formed on the 
basis of defined political agendas and long-term goals, not all of 
them have succeeded in disseminating their programs to the public 
clearly and coherently.  In Tunisia, one of the problems faced by 
some of the secular parties that contested the 2011 parliamentary 
elections is that they did not explain what their political programs 
and long-term goals were and their relevance to the majority of 
Tunisians.  They instead spent much of their campaigning time 
trying to discredit the programs of the Islamists.99  Islamist parties, 
on the other hand, formulated programs that built on their existing 
reputations prior to the revolutions.  However, this led to a degree 
of complacency as those programs were often vague and not fully 
developed, and thus failed to generate wide approval for the 
parties among the mixed citizenry that drove the revolutions.100 
6.4. Long-term strategy 
Political programs and goals need to be supported by a long-
term strategy.  Under authoritarianism, it was difficult for any 
oppositional political group in the Arab world to develop effective 
strategies.  Not surprisingly, in the current period of democratic 
transition, most emerging groups are at the stage of coping, 
                                                     
99 See Erin Cunningham, Tunisia Votes for New Democracy, GLOBALPOST (Oct. 
23, 2011, 9:32 AM), http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/ 
regions/middle-east/111023/tunisia-elections-tunisia-votes-new-leaders 
(describing the 2011 Tunisian uprising’s effect on elections and the Tunisians’ 
responses to various political parties vying for control). 
100 See Ghoshal, supra note 64 (explaining how the government’s prevalent 
corruption and arbitrariness led to citizens’ lack of patience and faith in 
democracy). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol34/iss2/2
03_KHATIB (DO NOT DELETE) 4/9/2013  3:46 PM 
2013] TRANSITION IN THE ARAB WORLD 339 
reacting, and learning, as opposed to developing long-term 
strategies for the economic, political, or social spheres.  However, 
political groups are likely to evolve and hone their strategies as 
they learn from their own experiences and mistakes. 
6.5. Coalitions 
The final necessary infrastructural factor for viable political 
participation concerns the ability of groups to form coalitions with 
others.  In Egypt, during the presidential election in 2012, the 
Muslim Brotherhood reached out to a wide range of other political 
groups, including secular ones, and also formed coalitions with 
other groups in parliament, although it remains to be seen whether 
it will sustain this level of engagement; signs following the 
presidential decree (later rescinded) granting Morsi wide ranging 
emergency powers in November 2012 have not been positive.101  In 
Tunisia, not only has there been growing tension between Ennahda 
and secular groups, but the political scene saw the existence of 
competing secular parties with similar visions, none of which 
formed strong coalitions.102  This led to the creation of “The Call for 
Tunisia,” a secular yet conservative initiative attempting to unite 
former regime officials with seculars against the Islamists,103 
resulting in further alienation of liberal seculars who remain 
                                                     
101 See, e.g., David D. Kirkpatrick, Amid Uncertainties on Role, Egypt’s President-
Elect Begins Rituals of Office, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2012, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/26/world/middleeast/named-egypts-
winner-islamist-makes-history.html (discussing Morsi’s work with the Muslim 
Brotherhood and his stated intention to look outside the group to fill cabinet 
posts).  See also Egyptian President Annuls Emergency Decree (December 8, 2012), 
http://www.voanews.com/content/morsi-annuls-egypts-emergency-
decree/1561280.html.  The presidential decree of November 22 granted Morsi 
unlimited emergency powers, sparking violent protests in Egypt and 
condemnation by liberals.  Morsi rescinded the decree on December 8, 2012, 
though it allowed him to get the Constituent Assembly to pass the controversial 
draft Constitution on December 15, which was later approved through 
referendum. 
102 See Erik Churchill & Aaron Zelin, A Balancing Act: Ennahda’s Struggle with 
Salafis, SADA (Apr. 19, 2012), http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/ 
2012/04/19/balancing-act-ennahda-salafis/acsc (“Liberal parties have split apart 
and reformed into coalitions, only to disintegrate once more . . . .”). 
103 See Erik Churchill, The ‘Call for Tunisia,’ FOREIGN POL’Y (June 27, 2012), 
http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/06/27/can_call_for_tunisia_unite
_opposition%20 (describing the Call for Tunisia and its emphasis on creating 
unity among all secularists, regardless of political disposition).  
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outside those two competing spheres.  But the long-term effect is 
likely to be the evolution of some of those groups and coalitions 
and the disappearance of those who do not survive the political 
competition—in the end a healthy dynamic for the prospects of 
political participation.  But collective action that would enable such 
a sifting process is not easy to achieve.  The formation of coalitions 
is difficult in societies where segments of the population view 
others with suspicion, and where there are social, ethnic, and 
religious divisions.104 
7. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the prospects for political participation in the 
post-revolutionary Arab world face several challenges on both the 
structural and infrastructural levels.  This is not surprising 
considering the decades of authoritarianism that the region is 
recovering from.  But the progress that has already been made and 
that is likely to come, no matter how small, is an important 
indicator that although it may not fully materialize in the short 
term, a new era of political participation in the Arab world is in the 
making. 
                                                     
104 See Dan M. Kahan, The Logic of Reciprocity: Trust, Collective Action, and Law, 
102 MICH. L. REV. 71, 72 (2003) (“[I]ndividuals who lack faith in their peers can be 
expected to resist contributing to public goods, thereby inducing still others to 
withhold their cooperation as a means of retaliating.  In this self-sustaining 
atmosphere of distrust, even strong (and costly) regulatory incentives are likely to 
be ineffective in promoting desirable behavior.”). 
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